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Abstract. We analyze a tractable model of a limit order book on short time scales, where the dynamics
are driven by stochastic fluctuations between supply and demand. We establish the existence of a limiting
distribution for the highest bid, and for the lowest ask, where the limiting distributions are confined between
two thresholds. We make extensive use of fluid limits in order to establish recurrence properties of the model.
We use the model to analyze various high-frequency trading strategies, and comment on the Nash equilibria
that emerge between high-frequency traders when a market in continuous time is replaced by frequent batch
auctions.
1. Introduction.
A limit order book (LOB) is a trading mechanism for a single-commodity market. The mechanism is of
significant interest to economists as a model of price formation. It is also used in many financial markets,
and has generated extensive research, both empirical and theoretical: for a recent survey, see [11].
The detailed historic data from LOBs in financial markets has encouraged models able to replicate the
observed statistical properties of these markets. Unfortunately, the added complexity usually makes the
models less analytically tractable and, with relatively few exceptions, such models are explored by simulation
or numerical methods. Our aim in this paper is to analyze a simple and tractable model of a LOB, first
introduced by [22] and independently by [16] and by [19]. The basic form of the model explicitly excludes a
number of significant features of real-world markets. Nevertheless we shall see that, from the model, several
non-trivial and insightful results can be obtained on the structure of high-frequency trading strategies.
Further, the model has a natural interpretation for a competitive and highly traded market on short time-
scales, where the excluded features may be less significant. We believe the model may be helpful in discussions
of market design, and as an illustration we use the model to comment on the Nash equilibria that emerge
between high-frequency traders when a market in continuous time is replaced by frequent batch auctions.
To motivate the model consider a market with only two classes of participant. Firstly, long-term investors
who place orders for reasons exogenous to the model,1 who view the market as effectively efficient for
their purposes, and who do not shade their orders strategically. Temporary imbalances between supply
and demand from such long-term investors will cause prices to fluctuate even in the absence of any new
information becoming available concerning the fundamentals of the underlying asset. Our second class of
participant, high-frequency traders, attempt to benefit from these price fluctuations by providing liquidity
between the long-term investors. In practice we should expect a spectrum of behavior between these two
extremes. The extreme case, with just long-term investors and high-frequency traders, is clearly a caricature,
but we shall see that it does allow us to analyze various high-frequency trading strategies (for example
market-making, sniping and mixtures of these) and the Nash equilibria between them.
We next describe the model of a LOB for an example involving long-term investors only, and outline our
results for this example. A bid is an order to buy one unit, and an ask is an order to sell one unit. Each
order has associated with it a price, a real number. Suppose that bids and asks arrive as independent Poisson
processes of unit rate and that the prices associated with bids, respectively asks, are independent identically
distributed random variables with density fb(x), respectively fa(x). An arriving bid is either added to the
LOB, if it is lower than all asks present in the LOB, or it is matched to the lowest ask and both depart.
Similarly an arriving ask is either added to the LOB, if it is higher than all bids present in the LOB, or it is
The second author’s research was partially supported by NSF Graduate Research Fellowship and NSF grant DMS-1204311.
1For example, to manage their portfolios. Investors may differ in their preferences and in their valuations, even given the
same information, which creates potential gains from trade.
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matched to the highest bid and both depart. The LOB at time t is thus the set of bids and asks (with their
prices), and our assumptions imply the LOB is a Markov process.
For this model we show that there exists a threshold κb with the following properties: for any x < κb
there is a finite time after which no arriving bids less than x are ever matched; and for any x > κb the
event that there are no bids greater than x in the LOB is recurrent. Similarly, with directions of inequality
reversed, there exists a corresponding threshold κa for asks. Further there is a density pia(x), respectively
pib(x), supported on (κb, κa) giving the limiting distribution of the lowest ask, respectively highest bid, in
the LOB. The densities pia, pib solve the equations
(1a) fb(x)
∫ κa
x
pia(y)dy = pib(x)
∫ x
−∞
fa(y)dy
(1b) fa(x)
∫ x
κb
pib(y)dy = pia(x)
∫ ∞
x
fb(y)dy.
As a specific example, if fa(x) = fb(x) = 1, x ∈ (0, 1), then κa = κ, κb = 1− κ, pia(x) = pib(1− x), and
(2) pib(x) = (1− κ)
(
1
x
+ log
(
1− x
x
))
, x ∈ (κ, 1− κ)
where the value of κ is given as follows. Let w be the unique solution of wew = e−1: then w ≈ 0.278 and
κ = w/(w + 1) ≈ 0.218. Observe that any example with fa = fb can be reduced to this example by a
monotone transformation of the price axis.
The existence of thresholds with the claimed properties is a relatively straightforward result, using Kol-
mogorov’s 0–1 law. In order to make the claimed distributional result precise the major challenge is to
establish positive recurrence of certain binned models: such models arise naturally where, for example,
prices are recorded to only a finite number of decimal places. Given a sufficiently strong notion of recurrence
the intuition behind equations (1) is straightforward: in equilibrium the right-hand side of equation (1a) is
the probability flux that the highest bid in the LOB is at x and that it is matched by an arriving ask with a
price less than x, and the left-hand side is the probability flux that the lowest ask in the LOB is more than
x and that an arriving bid enters the LOB at price x; these must balance, and a similar argument for the
lowest ask leads to equation (1b). To establish positive recurrence of the binned models we make extensive
use of fluid limits (see [2]), an important technique in the study of queueing networks.
The orders we have described so far are called limit orders to distinguish them from market orders which
request to be fulfilled immediately at the best available price. Market orders are straightforward to include
in the model: in the specific example just described we simply associate a price 1 or 0 with a market bid or
market ask respectively. As the proportion of market bids increases towards a critical threshold, w ≈ 0.278 in
the above example, the support of the limiting distributions pia, pib increases to approach the entire interval
(0, 1): above the threshold the model predicts recurring periods of time when there will exist either no
highest bid or no lowest ask in the LOB. This conclusion necessarily holds, with the same critical threshold
w, for any example with fa = fb.
A LOB is a form of two-sided queue, the study of which dates at least to the early paper of [12], who
modeled a taxi-stand with arrivals of both taxis and travellers as a symmetric random walk. Recent the-
oretical advances involve servers and customers with varying types and constraints on feasible matchings
between servers and customers, with applications ranging from large-scale call centres to national waiting
lists for organ transplants (cf. [1, 23, 27]). Our interest in models of LOBs is in part due to the simplicity
of the matchings in this particular application: types, as real variables, are totally ordered and so when an
arriving order can be matched the match is uniquely defined.
Next we comment on several important features of real-world markets that are missing from the above
basic model of a LOB. We assume that orders (from investors) are never cancelled and that the arrival
streams of orders, with their prices, are not dependent on the state of the LOB. These assumptions might
be natural for orders from our long-term investors who view the market as effectively efficient for their
purposes. These assumptions, and the related assumption of stationarity of the arrival streams, may also
be natural for a high-volume market where there may be a substantial amount of trading activity even over
time periods where no new information becomes available concerning the fundamentals of the underlying
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asset. Mathematically the model may then be viewed as assuming a separation between the time-scale of
trading, represented in the model, and a longer time-scale on which fundamentals change.
The assumption that all orders are for a single unit is important mathematically for the derivation of
equations (1); economically, it corresponds to an assumption of a competitive market where an investor does
not need to think about the impact of her order size on the market. We note that a long-term investor
placing a large order may attempt to be passive in her execution, so as not to move the price against her, by
spreading the order in line with volume in the market; see [8]. The natural question then becomes over how
long the order is spread, and the model can give insight here. We note, however, that our assumption of a
separation between the time-scale of trading and the timescale on which fundamentals change, modeled by
our assumption of stationarity of arrival streams, may no longer be tenable when the time taken by a large
investor to complete an order increases. In markets with a relatively small set of participants with large
orders other approaches may be necessary; see [7] for a discussion of trading protocols that complement limit
order books for large strategic investors.
Markets may contain traders other than long-term investors, and there is currently considerable interest
in the effect of high-frequency trading on LOBs. Importantly, many high-frequency trading strategies are
straightforward to represent within the model, since traders who can react immediately to an order entering
the LOB may leave the Markov structure intact. Consider first the following sniping strategy for a single
high-frequency trader: she immediately buys every bid that joins the LOB at price above q and every ask
that joins the LOB at price below p, where p and q are chosen to balance the rates of these purchases. This
model fits straightforwardly within our framework, and we show how to calculate the optimal values, for the
high-frequency trader, of the constants p and q. A single trader might instead behave as a market maker
and place an infinite number of bid, respectively ask, orders at p, respectively q, where κb < p < q < κa. We
are again able to analyze this case. The optimal profit rate under the sniping strategy may beat that under
the market making strategy: it does so for the specific example above where fa(x) = fb(x) = 1, x ∈ (0, 1),
describes the order flow from long-term investors. But a third strategy, which combines market making and
sniping, will generally beat both the individual strategies.
The model also allows us to readily explore the equilibria that emerge when there are multiple high-
frequency traders competing using market making or sniping strategies. There has been considerable discus-
sion recently of the effects of competition between multiple high-frequency traders, and of proposals aimed
to slow down markets. A key issue is that high-frequency traders may wastefully compete on the speed with
which they can snipe an order, and as a regulatory response Budish et al. [3, 4] propose replacing a market
continuous in time with frequent batch auctions, held perhaps several times a second. We consider Nash
equilibria in continuous and batch markets when there are multiple high-frequency traders competing using
mixtures of market making and sniping. Competition between market making traders reduces the bid-ask
spread and the traders’ profit rate, and does so whether the market is continuous or batch. Competition
between sniping traders in a batch market results in a Nash equilibrium with traders sniping bids above,
respectively asks below, a central price; the traders’ profit rate is slightly less in a batch market than a
continuous market.
Competition between sniping strategies produces a large number of cancelled orders since if a strategy’s
attempt to snipe an arriving order is not successful then the strategy immediately cancels its own order. A
notable feature of data from real LOBs, that a substantial proportion of orders are immediately cancelled [11],
thus emerges as a deduction from, rather than an assumption of, the model.
A discrete version of the model was first proposed by [22] in his pioneering work on regulation of secu-
rities markets, and the model was independently introduced by [16] and by [19]. Taking stationarity as an
assumption, [16] provided an extensive analysis of the model; our equations (1) can be deduced from [16,
Proposition 1], assuming steady-state behavior, by setting time derivatives to zero. Our contribution is to
establish the existence of the thresholds κa, κb and to prove a sufficiently strong notion of recurrence to
justify the intuition behind equations (1).
Previous research similar in mathematical framework to that reported here is by Cont and coauthors [6, 5],
by Simatos and coauthors [21, 14] building on Lakner et al. [15], and by Toke [25]: as we do, these authors
describe LOBs as Markovian systems of interacting queues and are able to obtain analytical expressions
for various quantities of interest. In the models of [6, 5, 15, 21, 14] the arrival rates of orders at any
given price depends on how far the price is above or below the current best ask or bid price; the models
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of [15, 21, 14, 25] are one-sided in that all bids are limit orders and all asks are market orders. Gao et
al. [10] study the temporal evolution of the the shape of a LOB in the model of [6], under a scaling limit.
Maglaras et al. [17] study a fragmented one-sided market in which traders may route their orders to one of
several exchanges. The work of Lachappelle et al. [13], building on Ros¸u [20], uses a different mathematical
framework, that of a mean field game, but shares with our approach some important features. In particular,
these authors distinguish between institutional investors whose decisions are independent of the immediate
state of the LOB and high-frequency traders who trade as a consequence of the immediate state of the LOB.
The models of both [5] and [13] keep detailed information on queue sizes only at the best bid and best ask
prices; [6] shares with our approach a Markov description of the entire LOB.
In much of the market microstructure literature features of LOBs, such as large bid-ask spreads, are
explained as a consequence of participants protecting themselves from others with superior information.
While this is clearly an important aspect of real-world markets we note that such features may also arise
from simpler models. The driving force for the dynamics of the LOB in our approach, as in [13, 20], is not
asymmetric information but stochastic fluctuations between supply and demand.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe precisely the model and our main
results. Section 3 develops the scaffolding necessary for the proofs, which are given in Section 4. In Section 5
we describe some applications of our results: this section contains our discussion of market orders, and of
high-frequency trading strategies and Nash equilibria.
2. Model and results.
The state of the LOB at time t is a pair (Bt, At) of (possibly infinite) counting measures on R; Bt
represents the prices of queued (not yet executed) bid orders, and At represents the prices of queued asks.
New orders arrive as a labeled point process; the label records the type of order (bid or ask) and the price.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the price axis has been continuously reparametrized so that all
prices fall in the interval (0, 1) (or, occasionally, [0, 1]).
Orders depart from the queue when an arriving order “matches” one of the orders already in the book.
We shall need several notions of what it means for two prices to match, and to capture this we introduce a
price equivalence function, that is a nondecreasing, not necessarily continuous, function P : [0, 1] → [0, 1].
A bid-ask pair is compatible if P(bid) ≥ P(ask).We shall primarily consider two types of price equivalence
function: P(x) = x, and the function that partitions all prices into n pricing bins. We will refer to the latter
case, where the image of P is a finite set, as the binned model. Note that the same price equivalence function
is applied to the prices of all the orders, and compatibility of bid-ask pairs is unchanged under any strictly
increasing transformation of the equivalence function.
We are now ready to formally define the evolution limit order book Lt.
Initial state: Initially, there should be no compatible bid–ask pairs in the book. Equivalently, the initial
state (B0, A0) satisfies
B0[x, 1) ·A0(0, y] = 0 if P(y) ≤ P(x).
Most of the time we assume that the total number of orders in the book is finite; we relax this assumption
in Section 5, where we allow an infinite number of orders to be placed at a single price, and otherwise the
book is finite.
Order arrival process: New orders arrive as a Poisson process with iid labels designating the type and
price of the order. Unless specified otherwise, we assume that P(bid) = P(ask) = 1/2.2 We assume the labels
of orders are independent and identically distributed, and in particular independent of the state of the book,
but the distributions of prices may depend on type. We let Fa be the CDF of prices of arriving asks, and Fb
be the CDF of prices of arriving bids. We will often assume that the distributions of the prices of arriving
orders have densities fa and fb respectively; this entails no loss of generality, because the LOB evolution is
defined by the combination of the arriving price distributions and a price equivalence function, and thus we
can always assume that the arriving orders have densities and only become discontinuous after being put
through the price equivalence function.
2The Poisson structure is not important to the book, because all that matters is the sequence of order arrivals. Unequal
rates of arrival for bids and asks are considered in Section 5.1.1.
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Change at order arrival: We do not allow cancellations in the model (until Section 5), so all changes to the
state occur at the time of an order arrival. Suppose at time t a bid at price p arrives. If there is a matching
ask in the book, i.e. if At−(0, y] > 0 for some y such that P(y) ≤ P(x), then nothing happens to the bids
in the book (Bt = Bt−), and the lowest ask departs: At = At− − δq, where q = min{x : At−{x} > 0}3 . If
there are no matching asks in the book, the bid joins the book: Bt = Bt−+ δp and At = At−. The situation
is symmetric if the arriving order is an ask at price q: if there is a matching bid, the two orders depart (so
At = At− and Bt = Bt− − δp where p = max{x : Bt−{x} > 0}), and if there are no matching bids, then the
ask joins the book (Bt = Bt− and At = At− + δq).
We will be keeping track of the highest (price of a) bid βt and lowest (price of an) ask αt in the book at
time t. If an order departs the book at time t, it must be at price βt− (if a bid) or αt− (if an ask). We allow
B0{x} =∞ or A0{y} =∞; if this is the case, then no bids left of x, and no asks right of y, will ever depart
the limit order book, since they will never be the highest bid (respectively lowest ask).
Below, we will refer to continuous and discretized models of LOBs. A continuous LOB is one where the
order price densities fa and fb (exist and) are bounded above and below, and the price equivalence function
is P(x) = x. Discretized models will use some binned price equivalence function, and will sometimes (but
not always) assume that all bins receive a positive proportion of the orders of each type.
For a discretized, binned LOB, we will use notation JxK to denote the index of the bin containing x; JxK
is a positive integer ranging from 1 to N for some N > 0.
We now present the main results concerning the model. The first result, Theorem 2.1, establishes a
transition at threshold values κb and κa. Eventually bids arriving below κb, and asks arriving above κa, will
never be executed; whereas all bids arriving above κb, and all asks arriving below κa, will be executed. The
second result, Theorem 2.2, presents the distribution of the rightmost bid and leftmost ask.
Theorem 2.1 (Thresholds). There exist prices κb and κa with the following properties:
(1) For any  > 0 there exists, almost surely, a (random) time T0 < ∞ such that βt > κb −  and
αt < κa +  for all t ≥ T0.
(2) For any  > 0, infinitely often there will be no orders with prices in (κb + , κa − ).
(3) Let x > κb +  and y < κa −  for some  > 0. Consider the LOB started with infinitely many bids
at x, infinitely many asks at y, and finitely many orders in between. The evolution of the orders at
prices in the interval (x, y) is a positive (Harris) recurrent Markov process, with finite expected time
until there are no orders in the interval.
The fact that there will infinitely often be no bids above x, and no asks below y, is a consequence of
Kolmogorov’s 0–1 law; the challenge is to show that there will simultaneously be neither bids nor asks in the
interval (x, y). In fact, we shall need to prove this part of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 below in tandem.
Theorem 2.2 (Distribution of the highest bid). Consider a continuous LOB; that is, P(x) = x, and the
densities fb and fa are bounded above and below. Then
(1) The limiting distributions of the highest bid and lowest ask have densities, denoted pib and pia; let
$b = pib/fb and $a = pia/fa.
(2) The thresholds satisfy 0 < κb < κa < 1, and also Fb(κb) = 1− Fa(κa).
(3) The distribution of the highest bid is such that $b is the unique solution to the ordinary differential
equation (
− fa(x)
1− Fb(x) (Fa(x)$b(x))
′
)′
= $b(x)fb(x)
with initial conditions
(Fa(x)$b(x))|x=κb = 1, (Fa(x)$b(x))′|x=κb = 0
and the additional constraint $b(x)→ 0 as x ↑ κa. The distribution of the lowest ask is determined
by a similar ODE.
3The minimum exists when the initial state of the book is finite, since only finitely many orders are present in the book.
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Figure 1. Limiting density of the highest bid for the binned LOB with 50 bins, and limiting
density for a continuous LOB (dotted line). Note the “shoulder” bin in the binned model:
the threshold in the continuous LOB lies in the interior of this bin.
Corollary 2.3 (Uniform arrivals). Suppose that P(x) = x and the arrival price distribution is uniform on
(0, 1) for both bids and asks. Then κb = κ ≈ 0.218 is given by κ = w/(w+1) where wew = e−1. The limiting
density of the highest bid is supported on (κ, 1− κ), and is given by
$b(x) = 1(κ,1−κ)(1− κ)
(
1
x
+ log
(
1− x
x
))
and the limiting density of the lowest ask is $a(x) = $b(1− x).
Remark 1 (Absolute continuity). We can replace conditions on the densities fa and fb by the requirement
that dFa/dFb be bounded above and below; however, it is more natural to state the result of Theorem 2.2
in terms of densities. The boundedness requirement avoids the trivial counterexamples fb = 21[0,1/2),
fa = 21(1/2,1] (nonoverlapping supports, no orders leave) or fa = 21[0,1/2), fb = 21(1/2,1] (nonoverlapping
supports, no threshold).
Through a reparametrization of the price axis, Corollary 2.3 covers all cases where arriving bid and ask
prices have identical densities. We describe some other analytically tractable applications of Theorem 2.2 in
Section 5. We shall also, in Section 5, extend the analysis to deal with some examples where the supports
of the bid and ask price distributions do not coincide.
Remark 2. The form of the limiting density appearing in Corollary 2.3 can be deduced from equations
(63)–(64) of [16, Section 3] after applying a coordinate transformation to convert between [0,∞) and [0, 1).
In Figure 1, we show the exact limiting distribution of the highest bid for the binned LOB with uniform
arrivals over 50 bins, along with the limiting distribution for the continuous LOB. Note the “shoulder” bin:
in the binned LOB, the threshold happens to fall into the middle of a bin, so the long-term probability of
having the rightmost bid in the bin is positive but below the continuous limit.
While we have been able to compute analytically the distribution of the location of the rightmost bid,
there are many related quantities for which we do not have exact expressions in steady-state (although
the positive recurrence established in Theorem 2.1 implies that they are well-defined and can be estimated
consistently from simulation). Notably, except in the special case to be considered in Section 5.1.3, we have
not been able to derive analytic expressions for the equilibrium height of the book (i.e. expected number of
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bids or asks at a given price in the binned model), or for the joint distribution of the highest bid and lowest
ask. For an illustration of the simulated joint density of the highest bid and lowest ask, see [26].
2.1. Brief summary of notation. We summarize here our notation, as well as some of the main assump-
tions used in the text.
L: limit order book.
P: price equivalence function, a monotone increasing function. Most of the time we use either P(x) = x or
the function that places all prices into one of several bins.
At, Bt: the counting measure of asks, respectively bids, at time t.
Fa, Fb: CDFs of the prices of arriving ask and bid orders. Until Section 5.1.1, newly arriving orders are
assumed to have equal probability of being a bid or an ask. In a binned model, we may write Fa,b(n) (with
n an integer) to refer to the fraction of orders arriving into bins with index ≤ n, i.e. the CDF evaluated at
the rightmost endpoint of the interval.
fa, fb: the corresponding densities, which are assumed to exist. For most results, fa and fb are assumed to
be bounded above and below.
αt, βt: the price of the lowest ask, respectively highest bid, at time t. Note that this is the actual price, not
the bin containing it.JxK: in a binned LOB, the index of the bin containing price x.
κa, κb: limiting prices above (respectively below) which only finitely many asks (bids) are ever executed. It
is not obvious a priori that κa < 1 or κb > 0; we prove this fact in Step 3 of the proof of Proposition 4.2.
For functions of two or more arguments, we may interchange arguments and subscripts: thus, fk,n(t) ≡
fn(k, t) ≡ f(k, n, t). We will use notation fn(k, ·) when we wish to consider f as a function of the third
argument alone.
3. Preliminary results: monotonicity.
Before proving the main results, we erect some scaffolding. Part of its purpose is to allow us to transition
between continuous LOBs (for which we expect to get differential equations in the answer) and binned
models (which can be modeled as countable-state Markov chains). It will also allow us to compare LOBs
with different arrival price distributions.
Lemma 3.1 asserts that the state of the limit order book is Lipschitz in the initial state with Lipschitz
constant 1: in particular, small perturbations in the arrival and matching patterns will lead to small per-
turbations in the state of the book. Lemma 3.2 asserts that actions that decrease cumulative bid and ask
queues by either shifting orders or removing them in bid–ask pairs will only decrease future queue sizes.
Lemma 3.1 (Adding one order). Consider a limit order book L, and let L˜ differ from L by the addition of
one bid at time 0; let their arrival processes and price equivalence functions be the same. Then at all times
L˜ differs from L either by the addition of one bid or by the removal of one ask.
Proof. Proof. The roles of “bid” and “ask” are symmetric here. The claim clearly holds until the additional
bid is the highest bid that departs from the system; once it does, L differs from L˜ by the addition of a single
ask, and the result follows by induction. 
Define cumulative queue sizes Qb(p, t) = Bt(0, p], Qa(p, t) = At[p, 1). (Note that we count bids from the
left and asks from the right.) When we want to highlight the dependence on only one of the variables, we
will drop the other variable into a subscript.
Lemma 3.2 (Decreasing queues). Consider a limit order book L, and let L˜ differ from L by modifying
the initial state in such a way that Q˜b(·, 0) ≤ Qb(·, 0), Q˜a(·, 0) ≤ Qa(·, 0) (as functions of price), and also
Q˜b(1, 0) − Q˜a(0, 0) = Qb(1, 0) −Qa(0, 0). In words, to get from L to L˜, at time 0 we remove some bid–ask
pairs, and/or shift some bids to the right, and/or shift some asks to the left. Then at all future times t ≥ 0,
Q˜b(·, t) ≤ Qb(·, t) and Q˜a(·, t) ≤ Qa(·, t) as functions of price.
Proof. Proof. We show Q˜b ≤ Qb, the argument for asks being identical. The argument proceeds by induction
on time, i.e. the number of arrived orders. Throughout the proof, we use notation ft− = lims↘t f(s) for the
left limit of a ca`dla`g function f .
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Consider first the arrival of a bid at time t and price p. For it to upset the inequality, it must stay
in L˜ but depart immediately in L; additionally, we need Qb(q, t−) = Q˜b(q, t−) for some q ≥ p. Note
that if the bid departs immediately in L, the leftmost ask at αt− must be compatible with p, and in
particular there are no bids right of p: Qb(p, t−) = Qb(1, t−). This, together with Qb(q, t−) = Q˜b(q, t−)
and Q˜b(·, t−) ≤ Qb(·, t−), implies that Qb(1, t−) = Q˜b(1, t−). Since bid–ask departures occur in pairs, this
in turn implies Qa(0, t−) = Q˜a(0, t−). But it is easy to see that if Q˜a(·, t−) ≤ Qa(·, t−) and they are equal
at 0, then α˜t− (the leftmost jump of Q˜a(·, t−)) and αt− (the leftmost jump of Qa(·, t−)) satisfy α˜t− ≤ αt−,
and hence the arriving bid actually departs immediately in L˜ as well.
Next consider the arrival of an ask at time t and price p. For it to upset the inequality, it must cause the
departure of the highest bid in L, but not in L˜, and we must have Qb(q, t−) = Q˜b(q, t−) for some q ≥ βt−
with P(βt−) ≥ P(p). Now, in L˜ there are no bids at prices ≥ P(p), hence Q˜b(1, t−) = lim→0 Q˜b(p− , t−).
However, this contradicts the inequality Q˜b(·, t−) ≤ Qb(·, t−), since lim→0Qb(p− , t−) ≤ lim→0Qb(βt−−
, t−) ≤ Qb(1, t−) − 1. (Note that inequalities may not be equalities if there are multiple bids at the same
price.) 
We can use this lemma to compare two limit order books L and L˜ with identical initial states and order
arrival processes, but different price equivalence functions. Suppose the price equivalence function P˜ merges
some of the values that were distinguished by P. Then any bid–ask pair that is compatible in L is also
compatible in L˜; and possibly additional bid–ask pairs are compatible in L˜ as well. This lets us apply
Lemma 3.2 to conclude that fewer orders will be present in L˜.
We can give an upper bound on the queue sizes in L by using a binned LOB with one more bin and a
shifted arrival process. If L has a bid arrival at price x in bin k = JxK, we let L̂ have a bid arrival at some
price in bin k − 1. The ask arrivals are identical in L and L̂. (If bins of L are numbered 1 through N , then
bins of L̂ are numbered 0 through N ; bids arrive into bins 0 through N − 1 in L̂, while asks arrive into bins
1 through N .) Under this arrangement, any bid–ask pair that is compatible in L̂ was compatible in L as
well, so L˜ offers an upper bound on the queue sizes of L. Consequently we can bound a continuous LOB
L both from above and from below by two binned LOBs with slightly different arrival price distributions.
(Assuming the continuous LOB has arrival distributions supported on [0, 1], the binned LOB providing the
upper bound will have bid arrival distribution supported on [−, 1− ] and ask arrival distribution supported
on [0, 1].)
Finally, when bin sizes are small, the difference in the arrival price distributions will be small, and we’ll
use Lemma 3.1 to bound the rate at which the states of L˜ and L̂ diverge. This will let us show that the
behavior of the continuous LOB converges in a suitable sense.
4. Proof of main results.
We begin by stating a weaker form of Theorem 2.1.
Proposition 4.1 (Weak thresholds). There exist prices κb and κa with the following properties:
(1) For any  > 0 there exists, almost surely, a (random) time T0 < ∞ such that βt > κb and αt < κa
for all t ≥ T0.
(2) For any  > 0, infinitely often there will be no bids with price exceeding κb + . Similarly, infinitely
often there will be no asks with price below κa − .
(3) The threshold values κb and κa satisfy Fb(κb) = 1− Fa(κa).
In addition, suppose that the bid and ask price densities (exist and) are bounded above by M . Then the
following holds:
(4) For any  > 0, with probability 1, there exists a sequence of times Tn → ∞ such that at time Tn
there are no bids with prices above P(κb) + , and the number of asks with prices below P(κa)−  is
bounded above by 2(M + 1)Tn.
Remark 3. Although the compatibility of bid–ask pairs is driven by the price equivalence function P(x), the
statements about κ are in terms of x itself. This is because whenever there are compatible bid–ask pairs, the
bid with the highest value of x and the ask with the lowest value of x always depart the book. In particular,
in a binned model, κb and κa will usually fall in the middle of some bin; in this “shoulder” bin, a nontrivial
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fraction of the arriving orders remain in the book forever. In Figure 1, κb is approximately half-way through
the “shoulder” bin. (It is also possible for κb to form the edge of a bin.)
Remark 4. Note that we make no assertions here about the behavior of n−1Tn as n→∞: for the purposes of
this proposition, this sequence may well tend to zero. The proof of Theorem 2.1 will show that for any  > 0
the sequence n−1Tn = n−1Tn() is in fact eventually bounded away from zero, with the bound depending
on .
Proof. Proof. The first two claims follow from Kolmogorov’s 0–1 law. Consider the events
Eb(x) = {finitely many bids will depart from prices ≤ x}
Ea(x) = {finitely many asks will depart from prices ≥ x}.
Lemma 3.1 shows that these events are in the tail σ-algebra of the arrival process. Since the arrival process
consists of a sequence of independent and identically distributed events, Kolmogorov’s 0–1 law ensures that
for each x, Eb(x) has probability 0 or 1 (and similarly for Ea(x)). Now let
(3a) κb = sup{x : P(Eb(x)) = 1}, κa = inf{x : P(Ea(x)) = 1}.
(If the set whose extremum is to be taken is empty, we let κb = 0 or κa = 1.) The first two asserted properties
now follow upon noticing that Eb(x) ⊆ Eb(y) for x ≥ y, and that whenever there is a bid departure at price
x, there must be no bids at prices higher than x. (The situation is similar for asks.)
We next show that Fb(κb) +Fa(κa) = 1. From the strong law of large numbers for the arrival process and
the 0–1 law above, we know that Fb(κb) is the smallest limiting proportion of arriving bids that stay in the
system:
(3b) Fb(κb) = lim inf
t→∞
1
t
#(bids in the LOB at time t).
A similar equality clearly holds for asks with 1−Fa(κa). Since bids and asks always depart in pairs, a further
appeal to the strong law of large numbers for the arrival process shows that we must have Fb(κb) = 1−Fa(κa).
The existence of times Tn as in part (4) of the theorem follows by a similar argument from the functional
law of large numbers for the arrival processes. With probability 1, picking a large enough time Tn when
there are no bids at prices above P(κb) +  ensures that there are at most (Fb(κa) + (M + 1))Tn asks in
the system. Since asks to the right of κa arrive at rate (1−Fa(κa)) = Fb(κb) and eventually never leave, for
large enough Tn there will be at most 2(M + 1)Tn asks at prices below κa − . 
This result is weaker than the positive recurrence we wish to prove eventually: in particular, it does not
show that the total number of both types of orders between κb and κa is ever zero. To obtain statements
about positive recurrence, we shall need to use fluid limit techniques, and our overall approach will be similar
to that in [2, Chapter 4]. The final proof of stability will use multiplicative Foster’s criterion (state-dependent
drift), see [18, Theorem 13.0.1]. In order to get there, we need to show that whenever there are many bids
or asks in (κb, κa), their number tends to decrease at some positive, bounded below, rate over long periods
of time. This is a standard line of argument in queueing theory; but the challenge of the model is that the
evolution of the queues depends on which queues are positive, rather than which queues are large. In general
Markov chains of this form are very difficult to analyze ([9] show that in general the stability of such chains
is undecidable), but the special structure of our chain makes it amenable to analysis. The outline of the
proof is as follows.
(1) We work with binned LOBs. We begin by showing that, after appropriate rescaling, both the queue
sizes and the local time of the highest bid (lowest ask) in each bin converge to a set of Lipschitz
trajectories, which we call fluid limits. We then proceed to develop properties of the fluid limits.
(2) We next show that all fluid limits tend to zero for bins (strictly) between JκbK + 1 and JκaK− 1. We
exploit the equations and inequalities satisfied by fluid limits to show the following:
(a) There is an interval [x0, y0] on which, whenever the fluid limit of the number of orders is positive,
it decreases (at a rate bounded below). Therefore, after some time T0 (which depends on the
initial state), the fluid limit will be zero on [x0, y0]. The values x0 and y0 may not be bin
boundaries.
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(b) Following T0, we will be able to bound from below the rate of increase of the local time of the
rightmost bid on [x1, x0) for some x1 < x0, and of the leftmost ask on (y0, y1] for some y1 > y0.
Since whenever the highest bid is in [x1, x0) it has a positive chance of departing (and similarly
for asks in (y0, y1]), we conclude that whenever the number of orders in [x1, y1] is large, it will
decrease (at a rate bounded below). We repeat the argument until [xn, yn] ≈ [κb, κa]. The xi
and yi may not be bin boundaries in this step.
(3) We show that if on some interval, all fluid limits converge to 0 in finite time, then the binned LOB
is recurrent on that interval. (This step is standard for fluid limit arguments.) Since the number of
bids in a continuous limit order book can be bounded from above by binned ones, this will also show
recurrence of the continuous LOB.
4.1. ODE of the limiting distribution. Our first result shows that the ODE which should describe the
unique limit, as t→∞, of the empirical distribution of the highest bid does in fact describe some such limit.
In the process, we also establish 0 < κb < κa < 1.
Proposition 4.2 (Weak distribution of the highest bid). Suppose the arrival price distributions have densi-
ties bounded above and below, and consider a sequence of binned LOBs with the number of bins, N , tending
to infinity.
For each N and  > 0, let Tn = Tn(N, ) → ∞ be the sequence of times identified in part (4) of
Proposition 4.1. Let pib(n,N, ) be the discrete normalized empirical density of the highest bid over the
time interval [0, Tn]; that is,
pib(n,N, , x) =
time up to Tn that the highest bid is in JxK
Tn · (length of JxK) .
(1) There exists a unique limit limn→∞, N→∞, →0 pib(n,N, ) := pib, and similarly for asks.
(2) Denoting $b = pib/fb and $a = pia/fa, these satisfy the pair of integral equations
(4a) Fa(x)$b(x) =
∫ 1
x
$a(y)fa(y)dy, x ∈ (κb, κa);
∫ κa
κb
$b(x)fb(x)dx = 1,
(4b) (1− Fb(x))$a(x) =
∫ x
0
$b(y)fb(y)dy, x ∈ (κb, κa);
∫ κa
κb
$a(x)fa(x)dx = 1.
(3) Moreover, wherever $b is differentiable, it satisfies the ODE
(5a)
(
−1− Fb(x)
fa(x)
(Fa(x)$b(x))
′
)′
= $b(x)fb(x)
with initial conditions
(5b) (Fa(x)$b(x))|x=κb = 1, (Fa(x)$b(x))′|x=κb = 0
and the additional constraint $b(x) → 0 as x ↑ κa. The distribution of the leftmost ask satisfies a
similar ODE.
(4) The equation (5) has a unique solution; in particular, κb and κa are uniquely determined by it.
Remark 5 (Normalization and initial conditions). From the integral equation (4) it follows that $b will
be a continuous function of price, whereas pib may not be. In particular, if we are interested in piecewise
continuous functions fb and fa, then $b will satisfy the ODE (5a) on each of the segments where fb and fa
are continuous, and can be patched together from the requirement that $b(x) and (Fa(x)$b(x))
′ are both
continuous.
The initial conditions (5b) apply for LOBs with finite initial states. Consider instead a LOB L˜ with an
infinite bid order at some price p > κb. As long as the threshold κ˜b of L˜ is positive, we can do away with the
infinite order at p by changing the price equivalence function so that P(0) = P(κ˜b) = P(p): the evolution
of L˜ and this new LOB Lˆ will be the same at prices above p after the threshold time. In Lˆ, there is yet
another threshold κˆb, and the initial conditions (5b) hold for all x ∈ (κˆb, p], meaning $ˆb(x) = 1/Fa(x) on
that interval. Correspondingly, in L˜, the distribution of the highest bid price has an atom at p of mass∫ p
κˆb
1/Fa(x)dx. For the lowest ask price, we will of course have P(αt ≤ p) = 0, but it may be the case that
$a(x) 6→ 0 as x ↓ p: it may be discontinous at the location of the infinite bid.
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Remark 6. The computations in our Steps 2 and 3 below are similar to computations appearing in [16,
Section 1]; we present the full argument for completeness.
Proof. Proof. The proof proceeds as follows:
(1) Fix the number of bins N , and consider the collection of empirical densities pib(n,N, ), pia(n,N, ).
Along any sequence n→∞, N →∞, and → 0 there is a convergent subsequence.
(2) Any subsequential limit satisfies a certain pair of integral equations, hence some ODEs.
(3) The ODEs will directly imply κb < κa; in addition, 0 < κb and κa < 1.
(4) The solution to these ODEs is unique, and in particular the limit does not depend on the order of
n→∞, N →∞, and → 0.
Step 1: The space of probability distributions with compact support is compact, so along any sequence
of empirical distributions there will be convergent subsequences. Moreover, whenever the highest bid is in
bin JxK, bid departures occur from the bin at rate ≥ Fa(x)pib(JxK), whereas bid arrivals occur into that bin at
rate at most fb(x). Consequently, under the assumption of bounded densities fb, fa, the highest bid density
pib(JxK) ≤ fb(x)/Fa(x) is bounded uniformly in n, N , ; this guarantees the existence of limiting densities
along subsequences. Finally, the lower bound on fa and fb guarantees that $a and $b are bounded, and
hence also converge along subsequences. For steps 2 and 3, pia,b and $a,b refer to any such subsequential
limit, taken along a single subsequence for all four quantities.
Step 2: The integral equations are expressing the idea that the rate of bid arrival should be equal to the
rate of bid departure. Along a sequence of times where the queues are small (i.e.  ≈ 0), this is very nearly
true; it will be exactly true in the limit → 0. The bid arrival rate at x is fb(x)P(αt > x) = fb(x)
∫ 1
x
pia(y)dy,
and the bid departure rate at x is pib(x)Fa(x), so setting the two equal gives the result; the ODE is obtained
by differentiating twice.
Of course, if we fix the number of bins N , the limit distribution will be described by a difference equation
rather than an integral (or differential) equation. It is standard to see that the limit of solutions to the
difference equations solves the differential (or integral) equation.
Step 3: To see κb < κa, note that pib is bounded above by fb/Fa always, so if it integrates to 1 we
must have κb < κa. To see κb > 0 (and κa < 1), we consider a binned LOB L˜ with three bins, with bin
partitions at x and x+δ for some x ∈ (κb, κa). By monotonicity, Jκ˜bK = 1 and Jκ˜aK = 3. For δ small enough,
the number of orders in the middle bin will eventually be stochastically dominated by a geometric random
variable. Indeed, whenever there are bids in bin 2, more bids arrive at rate Fb(x + δ) − Fb(x) and depart
at the larger rate Fa(x+ δ) (this is after asks from bin 3 stop departing). The situation is similar for asks.
Consequently, in L˜ we must have p˜ib(2) > 0 and p˜ia(2) > 0.
If p˜ib(1) and p˜ia(3) were such that (almost) all orders depart, then from p˜ib(1)Fa(x) = Fb(x) we find
p˜ib(1)Fa(x) = Fb(x) =⇒ p˜ib(2) = Fa(x)− Fb(x)
Fa(x)
=⇒ Fa(x) > Fb(x).
Now let δ be small enough that Fa(x) > Fb(x + δ), and solve for p˜ib(2) from the alternative expression
p˜ib(2)Fa(x+ δ) = (Fb(x+ δ)− Fb(x))p˜ia(3). This gives
p˜ib(1) + p˜ib(2) =
Fb(x)
Fa(x)
+
Fb(x+ δ)− Fb(x)
Fa(x+ δ)
1− Fa(x+ δ)
1− Fb(x+ δ) < 1.
The contradiction shows that in fact in this LOB we must have p˜ib(1)Fa(x) < Fb(x) − η for some η > 0,
which implies Fb(κ˜b) ≥ η. By monotonicity, we obtain κb > 0 as well (for N large enough that the above
bin of width δ is one of the original bins of the LOB).
Step 4: The uniqueness of solution follows from the fact that we have a second-order ODE with two
initial conditions (which, as we just showed, are finite). Note that an alternative argument for κb > 0 would
be to show that pib(x) > 0 for some x > 0, since then the ODE forces pibFa/fb decreasing, and pib(x) ∼ 1/x
near 0, which is not integrable. However, it is not immediately obvious why in a binned LOB the highest bid
couldn’t spend (almost) all of its time in the leftmost bin, hence we give the more involved argument above.
It is at this moment possible that there are multiple solutions to the ODE with different values for κb.
Intuitively, this should not be the case, since any limiting κb should give the (unique) threshold value of the
continuous LOB. We will derive the uniqueness of the quadruple (κb, κa, pib, pia) from Lemma 4.3 below, which
shows that the solution of (5a) is monotonic in the initial conditions. This implies that the requirements
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∫ κa
κb
pib(x)dx = 1 and Fb(κb) = 1 − Fa(κa) pin down κb and κa uniquely, since decreasing κb increases the
initial value of $b and
d
dx$b. 
The second result we require about the ODE is monotonicity in the initial conditions:
Lemma 4.3 (ODE monotonicity). Let $b and $˜b be two solutions of the ODE (5a) with initial conditions
$b(x0) ≥ $˜b(x0), ($b)′(x0) ≥ ($˜b)′(x0).
Then for all x ≥ x0, $b(x) ≥ $˜b(x).
Proof. Proof. We may reparametrize space monotonically so that Fa(x) = x. Then the ODE (5a) becomes
(Fb(x)− 1)
(
x
d
dx
$b(x) +$b(x)
)′
+ xfb(x)
d
dx
$b(x) = 0,
which is a first-order ODE in ddx$b(x). Since solutions of first-order ODEs are increasing in their initial
conditions, we obtain ddx$b(x) ≥ ddx$˜b(x), and the desired inequality follows trivially. 
Corollary 4.4. Suppose the initial conditions for $b come (5b), and the initial conditions for $˜b are
Fa(x0)$˜b(x0) = 1, (Fa(x)$˜b(x))
′|x=x0 = 0 for some x0 > κb. Then $b(x0) ≤ $˜b(x0) and ddx$b(x)|x=x0 ≤
d
dx$˜b(x)|x=x0 . Consequently, $b(x) ≤ $˜b(x) for x ≥ x0.
Proof. Proof. Reparametrize space as before, so that Fa(x) = x. Then
(x$b(x))
′ = −pia(x), $b(x) = 1
x
(
1−
∫ x
0
$a(y)dy
)
.
From this it is clear that $b(x0) ≤ $˜b(x0). Further,
x
d
dx
$b(x) = −pia(x)−$b(x) = − 1
x
+
1
x
∫ x
0
($a(y)−$a(x))dy.
Now, in a LOB, (1− Fb(x))$a(x) is increasing (cf. x$b(x) which is decreasing), meaning $a is increasing.
Consequently, the integral above is nonpositive, and we see
x0
d
dx
$b(x)|x=x0 ≤ −
1
x0
= x0
d
dx
$˜b(x)|x=x0
as required. 
4.2. Fluid limits. In this section we introduce the fluid-scaled processes associated with the limit order
book, discuss their convergence to fluid limits, and determine properties of the limits. Throughout the
section, we work with a binned limit order book.
Let Bk(·) and Ak(·) be the arrival processes of bids and asks into bin k (indexed by time). The time
structure of these processes is not important for our results, so we may assume that these are Poisson
processes; by definition, they are independent. We will assume that the total arrival rate of bids is 1, and
also of asks, so that if pb(k) (respectively pa(k)) is the probability that an arriving bid (ask) falls into bin k,
this is also the arrival rate of bids (asks) into that bin. Let Qb(k, t) (respectively Qa(k, t)) be the number
of bids (asks) in bin k at time t. Let Tβ(k, t) and Tα(k, t) be the amount of time up to time t when the
rightmost bid, respectively leftmost ask, is in bin k: that is,
Tβ(k, t) =
∫ t
0
1{JβsK = k}ds, Tα(k, t) = ∫ t
0
1{JαsK = k}ds.
It is clear that the initial data Qb(k, 0), Qa(k, 0) together with the arrival processes Bk(·), Ak(·) give sufficient
information to determine the values of all of these processes at later times. We have the following expressions:
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JβtK = k ⇐⇒ Qb(k, t) > 0, ∑
k′>k
Qb(k
′, t) = 0(6a)
JαtK = k ⇐⇒ Qa(k, t) > 0, ∑
k′<k
Qa(k
′, t) = 0(6b)
Qb(k, t) = Qb(k, 0) +
∫ t
0
1{Jα(s)K > k}dBk(s)−∑
k′≤k
∫ t
0
1{Jβ(s)K = k}dAk′(s)(6c)
Qa(k, t) = Qa(k, 0) +
∫ t
0
1{Jβ(s)K < k}dAk(s)−∑
k′≥k
∫ t
0
1{Jα(s)K = k}dBk′(s)(6d)
Tβ(k, t) = Tβ(k, 0) +
∫ t
0
1{Jβ(s)K = k}ds(6e)
Tα(k, t) = Tα(k, 0) +
∫ t
0
1{Jα(s)K = k}ds(6f)
We define the fluid-scaled processes by Xn(t) = n
−1X(nt) for any process X. We now have the following
result on convergence to fluid limits:
Theorem 4.5 (Convergence to fluid limits). Consider a sequence of processes
(Bn(k, ·), An(k, ·), Qb,n(k, ·), Qa,n(k, ·), T β,n(k, ·), Tα,n(k, ·))
whose initial state (at time 0) is bounded: ||Qa,n(k, 0), Qb,n(k, 0)|| ≤ 1. As n → ∞, any such sequence has
a subsequence which converges, uniformly on compact sets of t, to a collection of Lipschitz functions
(bk(·), ak(·), qb(k, ·), qa(k, ·), τβ(k, ·), τα(k, ·)).
(Different subsequences may converge to different 6-tuples of Lipschitz functions.) We call the limiting 6-tuple
a fluid limit.
Any fluid limit satisfies the following equations almost everywhere (i.e. everywhere where the derivatives
are defined):
b′k(t) = pb(k), a
′
k(t) = pa(k)(7a)
∂
∂t
(τβ(k, t)) = 0 if
∑
k′>k
qb(k
′, t) > 0,
∂
∂t
(τα(k, t)) = 0 if
∑
k′<k
qa(k
′, t) > 0(7b)
JκaK∑
k=JκbK−1
τβ(k, t) = t,
JκaK+1∑
k=JκbK
τα(k, t) = t(7c)
qb(k, t) ≥ 0, qa(k, t) ≥ 0(7d)
∂
∂t
qb(k, t) = 0 if qb(k, t) = 0,
∂
∂t
qa(k, t) = 0 if qa(k, t) = 0(7e)
∂
∂t
qb(k, t) = pb(k)
∑
k′>k
∂
∂t
τα(k
′, t)− ∂
∂t
τβ(k, t)
∑
k′≤k
pa(k
′)(7f)
∂
∂t
qa(k, t) = pa(k)
∑
k′<k
∂
∂t
τβ(k
′, t)− ∂
∂t
τα(k, t)
∑
k′≥k
pb(k
′).(7g)
Proof. Proof. The expressions in (6) together with the functional law of large numbers for the arrival
processes lead to the u.o.c. convergence along subsequences to a fluid limit. The integral representation
implies that limits must be Lipschitz functions.
To see that any fluid limit must satisfy (7), we note that (7a) follows directly for the functional law of
large numbers for the arrival processes. Identities (7b) follows from the corresponding statement for prelimit
processes: if
∑
k′>k qb(k
′, s) >  > 0 on a time interval s ∈ (t − , t + ), then for all sufficiently large n,∑
k′>kQb,n(k
′, ns) > n/2 > 0, so Jβ(ns)K > k and Tβ,n(k, ns) is not increasing. Identity (7c) holds because
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the rightmost bid (leftmost ask) is eventually always in one of the bins in the prelimit processes, so this must
be true in the limit. Identities (7d) follows for a similar reason: prelimit queues are nonnegative, hence the
limit is nonnegative as well.
Identity (7e) is a corollary of (7d): a process that is always nonnegative, differentiable at t, and equal to
0 at t must have derivative 0 there.
Finally, identities (7f) and (7g) follow from (6a)–(6d) for the prelimit queues. More precisely, the rate at
which the bid queue size changes is as follows: if the lowest ask is higher than bin k, then bids arrive into
the queue at rate pb(k); and if the highest bid is in bin k, then all asks arriving at prices below k deplete
the queue at k. Because the location of the highest bid or lowest ask does not show up in the fluid limit, we
instead use the local times tβ and tα. 
We introduce notation piβ(k, t) =
∂
∂tτβ(k, t), piα(k, t) =
∂
∂tτα(k, t).
4.3. Fluid limits drain. We will now show that in a LOB that starts with infinitely many bids in JκbK + 1
and asks in JκaK − 1, the fluid limit queue sizes drain, i.e. converge to 0 on the bins ranging from JκbK + 1
to JκaK− 1. We will assume that bin widths (and hence pb(k), pa(k)) are all small. This is the meat of the
argument in the paper.
Theorem 4.6 (Fluid limits drain). Consider a fluid limit corresponding to a binned LOB with N bins.
Suppose the arrival process is symmetric (pb(k) = pa(N − k)), the probabilities pa,b(k) are bounded below,
and pb(k) is decreasing in k (pa(k) increasing in k). Suppose that initially there are infinitely many bids
in bin JκbK + 1 and infinitely many asks in JκaK − 1; then the fluid limit of queues can be described by
qa,b(k, t) for JκbK + 2 ≤ k ≤ JκaK− 2, and the fluid limit of the local times can be described by pia,b(k, t) forJκbK + 1 ≤ k ≤ JκaK− 1.
Let the initial state of the fluid limit satisfy ‖(qb(0), qa(0)‖ ≤ 1. There exists  = (N)→ 0 as N →∞, and
a time T depending on {pa(k), pb(k), bin widths}, such that for all bins k satisfying Jκb + K < k < Jκa − K,
and all times t ≥ T ,
qb(k, t) = 0, qa(k, t) = 0, ∀t ≥ T.
Further, in the interval Jκb + K < k < Jκa − K and for t ≥ T , the derivatives piβ(k, t) satisfy the
second-order difference equation
∆k
(
1− Fb(k)
pa(k + 1)
·∆k
(
Fa(k)
pb(k)
piβ(k)
))
= piβ(k + 1),
where the operator ∆k is given by ∆k(f) = f(k + 1)− f(k). The initial conditions satisfy
Fa(Jκb + K)
pb(Jκb + K) piβ(Jκb + K) ≤ 1, ∆Jκb+K
(
Fa(k)
pb(k)
piβ(k)
)
≤ 0.
A similar equation holds for asks. As N → ∞, the solution of the difference equation converges to the
solution of the ODE (5a) with initial conditions given by (5b).
Note that κa and κb are the thresholds of an LOB with a finite starting state; the LOB with infinite
bid and ask orders can be thought of as having different thresholds κ˜b < κb and κ˜a > κa. For large N ,
Lemma 3.1 implies κ˜b ≈ κb and κ˜a ≈ κa.
Proof. Proof. The proof proceeds in stages.
Stage 0. Let x0 be given by Fa(x0) = Fb(κa)−Fb(x0), and let y0 be given by 1−Fb(x0) = (1−Fa(κb))−
(1− Fa(y0)). Equivalently, Fa(x0) + Fb(x0) = 2x0 = Fb(κa), so x0 = 12Fb(κa), and y0 = 12 (1 + Fa(κb)).
Claim 0.1: κb ≤ x0 < y0 ≤ κa.
Proof: Note that Fa(κb) is a lower bound on the rate of bid departure from the Markov chain when there
are any bids present, while Fb(κb) − Fb(κa) is an upper bound on the rate of bid arrival. Consequently, if
Fa(κb) > Fb(κb) − Fb(κa), then the number of bids on the entire interval (κb, κa) would be stochastically
bounded, whereas it should scale as a random walk. A similar argument gives y0 ≤ κa. Finally, 12Fb(κa) =
1
2 (1− Fa(κb)) < 12 (1 + Fa(κb)), since κb > 0 by Proposition 4.2. 
Claim 0.2: There exists T0 = T0(M) such that for all times t ≥ T0 and all fluid models,
∑Jy0K−1
k=Jx0K+1(qb(k, t)+
qa(k, t)) = 0.
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Proof: Since these processes are absolutely continuous and nonnegative, it suffices to show that when-
ever there are any fluid orders in the interval (and all the derivatives are defined), the fluid number of
orders in the interval decreases at a rate bounded below. By (7f) and (7g), we see that for Q(t) =∑Jx0K+1≤k≤JκaK−1 qb(k, t),
Q′(t) ≤
{
0, Q(t) = 0∑JκbK−1
k=Jx0K+1 pb(k)−∑k′≤Jx0K+1 pa(k) < Fb(κb)− Fb(x0)− Fa(x0)− , Q(t) > 0.
Consequently, after a finite amount of time Tb,0, there will be no fluid bids in bins ≥ Jx0K+1. Similarly, after
a finite amount of time Ta,0, there will be no fluid asks in bins ≤ Jy0K− 1; we may take T0 = max(Tb,0, Ta,0).
Claim 0.3: There exists 0 > 0 such that for all times t ≥ T0 and all fluid models,
∑
k≤Jx0K piβ(k, t) ≥ 0
and
∑
k≥Jy0K piα(k, t) ≥ 0. (This result requires bins to be sufficiently small.)
Proof: Note that equations (7f) and (7g) hold at all times, even when there are no fluid orders in the bin;
thus, for t ≥ T0 and all k ∈ [Jx0K + 1, Jy0K− 1] we have
pb(k)
∑
k′>k
piα(k
′, t) = piβ(k, t)
∑
k′≤k
pa(k
′), pa(k)
∑
k′<k
piβ(k
′, t) = piα(k, t)
∑
k′≥k
pb(k
′).
Omitting the dependence on t for clarity, these equations, together with the observation that
∑
k piα(k) =∑
k piβ(k) = 1, can be rearranged to give two decoupled second-order difference equations for piα(k) and
piβ(k). We abuse notation to write Fa(k) =
∑
k′≤k pa(k
′) and similarly for Fb(k).
(8a) ∆k
(
1− Fb(k)
pa(k + 1)
·∆k
(
Fa(k)
pb(k)
piβ(k)
))
= piβ(k + 1), Jx0K + 1 ≤ k ≤ Jy0K− 1.
(There is a corresponding equation for pia, of course.)
If we had two initial conditions for this second-order difference equation, we would be able to solve it.
Unfortunately, in general we do not have such initial conditions, but we have bounds on them, namely
(8b)
Fa(Jx0K)
pb(Jx0K) piβ(Jx0K) ≤ 1, ∆Jx0K
(
Fa(k)
pb(k)
piβ(k)
)
≤ 0.
These inequalities would hold with equality in a different limit order book L˜0, in which we assign the same
low price to all the bins up through Jx0K + 1, and the same high price to all the bins from Jy0K− 1 up. (We
nonetheless keep track the bins containing the highest bid and lowest ask of L˜.) Corollary 4.4 shows that
the solutions to (8) on Jx0K + 1 ≤ k ≤ Jy0K− 1 are bounded from above by the solution for L˜. (The result is
in continuous space, but the arguments work just as well for difference equations.) We refer to the solution
for L˜ as p˜iβ and p˜iα.
Using the trivial upper bound on p˜iβ(k) for k ≥ Jy0K, we find
(9)
∑
k≤Jy0K−1
piβ(k) ≤
Jy0K−1∑
k=Jx0K+1
p˜iβ(k) +
JκaK−1∑
k=Jy0K
pb(k)
Fa(k)
.
Notice that p˜iβ must equal (Fa(k))
−1pb(k) for Jκ˜bK+1 ≤ k ≤ Jx0K, as bids will not be queueing in those bins.
Consequently, for the first term in the right-hand side of (9) we have the bound
Jy0K−1∑
k=Jx0K+1
p˜iβ(k) ≤ 1−
Jx0K∑
k=Jκ˜bK+1
pb(k)
Fa(k)
≤ 1−
JκaK−1∑
k=Jy0K
pb(k)
Fa(k)
− 0,
as long as the bins are narrow enough. Indeed, notice that x0 − κ˜b > x0 − κb = κa − y0 (from monotonicity
of L vs. L˜ and symmetry), the denominator is increasing in k, and the bid arrival density decreases with
translation to the right. We require the bins to be narrow enough that the sums are all nonempty.
Stage 1. We now let x1, y1 be defined by Fb(x0)−Fb(x1) = 0Fa(x1) and Fa(y1)−Fa(y0) = 0(1−Fb(y1)).
Similarly to the argument for Stage 0, there exists a time T1 such that for all t ≥ T1 there will be no fluid
queues on [Jx1K + 1, Jy1K − 1]. Indeed, if there are fluid bids in the interval [Jx1K + 1, Jx0K], then whenever
the highest bid is below Jx0K it is in fact in this interval; the defining inequality then means that the fluid
amount of bids in this interval decreases, and similarly for asks.
15
Next, we use the difference equation description on [Jx1K + 1, Jy0K− 1] to show that after T1, the highest
bid spends at least 1 > 0 of its time below x1. This will require comparison against a different restricted
LOB L˜1, where we merge all prices up to Jx1K + 1 and from Jy1K− 1.
Subsequent stages. We can now construct a nested sequence of intervals . . . < x2 < x1 < x0 < y0 <
y1 < y2 < . . . , where the inequalities are strict provided bins are narrow enough. It remains to show
that limk→∞,N→∞ xk = κb and limk→∞,N→∞ yk = κa. (Note that N → ∞, i.e. thinner bins, is certainly
necessary for this to hold!)
This result follows from the fact that i can be taken to be bounded below:
(10) i ≥
JxiK∑
k=Jκ˜bK+1
pb(k)
Fa(k)
−
JκaK−1∑
k=JyiK
pb(k)
Fa(k)
≥
(
1
Fa(JxiK) − 1Fa(JyiK)
)
(Fb(JxiK)− Fb(Jκ˜bK + 1)) .
As long as xi is bounded away from κb (and bin widths are small enough), this will be bounded below, and
therefore xi − xi+1 and yi+1 − yi will be bounded below.
Convergence to ODE. The convergence of bounded solutions to difference equations to solutions of an
ODE is standard. The argument above gives an inequality for the initial conditions, but note that as we
approach κb the initial conditions become exact. Indeed,
Fa(κb + )$b(κb + ) =
∫ 1
κb+
$a(x)fa(x)dx→ 1,
since the lowest ask will never be below κb. Also,
(Fa(x)$b(x))
′|x=κb+ = −$a(κb + ) = −(1− Fb(κb + ))−1
∫ κb+
0
$b(x)fb(x)dx→ 0,
since the highest bid density is bounded.
Putting this result together with Proposition 4.2 shows that, for symmetric distributions pb, pa with pb
decreasing, the fluid limits piβ(k, t)/pb(k), piα(k, t)/pa(k) will approach, as t→∞ and N →∞, the solution
of the ODE (5), uniformly on compact subsets of (κb, κa).
Remark 7. The argument leading to the inequality (10) implies that the joint density of the highest bid and
lowest ask must be bounded away from zero on at least a fraction of the boundary of the support, i.e. the
probability of the event “there are no asks below κa and the highest bid is at κb+x” should be O(x) but not
o(x). In fact, the simulated joint density in [26] is bounded away from 0 everywhere except the very corner
(highest bid at κb and lowest ask at κa).
It remains to show that stability of fluid limits implies positive recurrence of the Markov chain.
Lemma 4.7 (Fluid stability and positive recurrence). Consider a LOB satisfying the assumptions of Theo-
rem 4.6. Suppose that on some interval of bins k0 ≤ k ≤ k1, all fluid limits with initial state bounded above
by 1 satisfy the following: there exists a time T (depending on {pa(k), pb(k), bin widths}), such that for all
times t ≥ T ,
qb(k, t) = 0, qa(k, t) = 0, k0 ≤ k ≤ k1, t ≥ T.
Consider a limit order book L˜ started with infinitely many bids in bin k0 − 1 and infinitely many asks in
bin k1 + 1; its state is described by the Markov chain of queue sizes in bins k0 ≤ k ≤ k1. The Markov chain
associated with L˜ is positive recurrent.
Proof. Proof. To go between fluid stability and positive recurrence, we use multiplicative Foster’s criterion
[18, Theorem 13.0.1]. Let
Q(t) = ‖(Qb(k, t), Qa(k, t))k0≤k≤k1‖ ,
and let C be sufficiently large. Let Q(0) = q > C, and consider the fluid scaling Qa,b(k, t) = q
−1Qa,b(k, qt).
By Theorem 4.5, if C and hence q is large enough, there exists a fluid limit (qa(k, t), qb(k, t), τα(k, t), τβ(k, t))k0≤k≤k1
satisfying ‖qa(k, t), qb(k, t)‖ = 1, such that
P(
∥∥Qa(k, t)− qa(k, t), Qb(k, t)− qb(k, t)∥∥ > ) ≤  for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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In particular, P(‖Qa(k, qT ), Qa(k, qT )‖ > q) < . Note further that ‖Qa(k, qT ), Qb(k, qT )‖ ≤ A(qT ) +
B(qT ) is bounded by the arrival process, and hence has all moments. Thus, we conclude
Eq[‖Qa(k, qT ), Qb(k, qT )‖] ≤ (1 + 2T )q.
Choosing  < (1 + 2T )−1 completes the proof. 
4.4. General order price distributions. It remains to remove the extra conditions (symmetric and de-
creasing) on the order price distributions, and finish the argument for continuous limit order books. This
requires two observations:
(1) Recall that a continuous LOB could be bounded by two discrete LOBs with different arrival price
distributions (in one of them, we shift all arriving bids one bin to the left). This shifted arrival
distribution no longer satisfies the absolute continuity conditions, but nevertheless, Lemma 3.1 shows
that all of the above fluid-scaled arguments work for it as bin size shrinks to 0. Specifically, we model
the bid arrivals as shifting the rightmost bin of bids all the way to the left, and then the difference
between the two books is at most two bins’ worth of arrivals over the fluid time interval [0, T ],
which will be small provided bins are narrow. This allows us to conclude the positive recurrence
of a continuous LOB with infinitely many bids at price P(κb) +  and infinitely many asks at price
P(κa)−, provided the densities fa, fb are bounded above and below, symmetric, and fb is decreasing.
(2) By Lemma 3.2, replacing the bid arrival price distribution by another distribution with stochasti-
cally higher prices, and/or replacing the ask arrival price distribution by another distribution with
stochastically lower prices, results in fewer orders in a book. In particular, if we have shown the
positive recurrence of an LOB with an infinite supply of bids at price p and asks at price q with a
particular arrival distribution, the LOB will remain positive recurrent when we switch to an arrival
price distribution with bids further right, and asks further left. Notice that as long as there are
bids in the interval (p, q), they evolve on that interval identically whether or not there is an infinite
supply of bids at p; and similarly for asks. This can be used to show that fluid limits drain in the
new LOB on the interval (p, q).
In the new LOB with the shifted price distribution, (p, q) may not be close to (κ˜b, κ˜a), so we will
be wanting to extend the interval, as in Claim 0.3 of Theorem 4.6. The argument there does not
use the full extent of the symmetry and monotonicity conditions; they are only used to prove the
inequality JpK∑
k=JκbK+1
pb(k)
Fa(k)
≥
JκaK−1∑
k=JqK
pb(k)
Fa(k)
+ 
for some  > 0. For this inequality to hold, it is entirely sufficient to have
(11)
∫ p
κˆb
fb(x)
Fa(x)
dx ≥
∫ κ˜a
q
fb(x)
Fa(x)
dx+ ,
with no constraints on what happens between p and q.
Consequently, for a general pair of densities (fb, fa) bounded below and above, we begin by
finding fb,0, fa,0 with Fb,0 ≥ Fb, Fa,0 ≤ Fa which are symmetric and for which fb,0 is decreasing.
(For example, we may take fb,0 = fa,0 = min(fa, fb) on most of the interval, with fb,0 taking a large
value near 0, and fa,0 taking a large value near 1.) We use Theorem 4.6 to show that fluid limits
drain for fb,0, fa,0 (and hence, by Lemma 3.2, also for (fb, fa)) on an interval (κb,0, κa,0). We then
modify fb,1 on (0, κa,0) and fa,1 on (κb,0, 1) to find the next pair of bounded densities (fb,1, fa,1) for
which Fb,0 ≥ Fb,1 ≥ Fb, Fa ≤ Fa,1 ≤ Fa,0, and (11) holds. We already know from monotonicity that
fluid limits will drain for these distributions on (κb,0, κa,0), and we use the inequality for p ≤ κb,0
and q ≥ κa,0 to extend fluid stability to the bigger interval (κb,1, κa,1). We repeat the process until
the interval (κb,n, κa,n) approaches the entire interval (κ˜b, κ˜a) for (fb, fa).
To see that it will indeed approach the entire interval, notice that all that really matters for the
thresholds of a LOB is Fa,b(x), κb ≤ x ≤ κa; it is immaterial what fb and fa do outside of those
intervals, so long as they integrate to the correct amounts. Consequently, if κb,n > κ˜b + , it must
be that Fb,n < Fb or Fa,n > Fa somewhere on [κb,n, κa,n], which means that the process won’t get
“stuck” until κb,n ↘ κ˜b and κa,n ↗ κ˜a.
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5. Discussion.
In this section we discuss several applications of our methods and results. We begin with a discussion of
market orders and then consider various simple trading strategies.
5.1. Market orders. The orders we have considered so far, each with a price attached, are called limit
orders. Suppose that, in addition to limit orders, there are also market orders which request to be fulfilled
immediately at the best available price. Suppose that limit order bids and asks arrive as independent Poisson
processes of rates νb, νa respectively; and that the prices associated with limit order bids, respectively asks,
are independent identically distributed random variables with density fb(x), respectively fa(x). Without
loss of generality we may assume that x ∈ (0, 1). In addition suppose that there are independent Poisson
arrival streams of market order bids and asks of rates µb, µa respectively. Then these correspond to extreme
limit orders: we simply associate a price 1 or 0 with a market bid or market ask respectively.
Note that, in addition to market orders, we have also allowed an asymmetry in arrival rates between bid
and ask orders. The intuition behind equations (1) leads to the generalization
(12a) νbfb(x)
∫ κa
x
pia(y)dy = pib(x)
(
µa + νa
∫ x
0
fa(y)dy
)
(12b) νafa(x)
∫ x
κb
pib(y)dy = pia(x)
(
νb
∫ 1
x
fb(y)dy + µb
)
although now the existence of a solution to these equations satisfying the required boundary conditions is
not assured, and the deduction of the recurrence properties necessary for an interpretation of pib(x), pia(x) as
limiting densities may fail. To illustrate some of the possibilities we shall look in detail at a simple example.
Suppose fa(x) = fb(x) = 1, x ∈ (0, 1), νa = νb = 1 − λ and µa = µb = λ. Thus a proportion λ of all
orders are market orders. Use the notation pib(λ;x), pia(λ;x) for the solution to equations (12) satisfying
the required boundary conditions in this example. Then provided λ < w ≈ 0.278, the unique solution of
wew = e−1, this solution has pia(λ;x) = pib(λ; 1− x) and
(13) pib(λ;x) =
1− λ
1 + λ
· pib
(
1 + λ
1− λx−
λ
1− λ
)
, x ∈ (κ(λ), 1− κ(λ))
where pib(·) is the earlier solution (2) and
κ(λ) =
1 + λ
1− λ ·
w
1 + w
− λ
1− λ.
Indeed, provided λ < w the model is simply a rescaled version of the earlier model with distribution (13)
having a support increased from (κ, 1 − κ) to the wider interval (κ(λ), 1 − κ(λ)). The inclusion of market
orders in the model causes the price distributions to have atoms and not to be absolutely continuous with
respect to each other; but nevertheless the analysis of earlier sections continues to apply since the market
orders arrive outside of the range (κ(λ), 1− κ(λ)).
Next we explore this example as λ ↑ w and the support becomes the entire interval (0, 1). In our model a
market order bid, respectively ask, which arrives when there are no ask, respectively bid, limit orders in the
order book waits until it can be matched. When λ < w there is a finite (random) time after which the order
book always contains limit orders of both types and no market orders of either type and hence the analysis
of previous sections applies. But if λ > w then infinitely often there will be no asks in the order book and
infinitely often there will be no bids in the order book, with probability 1. Now the difference between the
number of bid and ask orders in the limit book is a simple symmetric random walk and hence null recurrent.
There will infinitely often be periods when the state of the order book contains limit orders of both types
and no market orders of either type, but such states cannot be positive recurrent.
In the model described above an arriving market order which cannot be matched immediately must wait
until it can be matched. If instead such orders are lost then we obtain a model which can be analyzed by
the methods in Section 5.2.1: namely, we start the LOB with an infinite bid order at 0 and an infinite ask
order at 1.
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5.1.1. Differing arrival rates. Our analysis in earlier sections assumed bids and asks arrived at the same
rate. This was without loss of essential generality, as it is convenient to illustrate now with a discussion of
equations (12) when fa(x) = fb(x) = 1, x ∈ (0, 1), νa, νb > 0 and µa = µb = 0. The solution to equations (12)
satisfying the required boundary conditions is then
(14) pib(x) = κa
(
1
x
+ log
(
1− x
x
)
− 1
κa
− log
(
1− κa
κa
))
, x ∈ (κb, κa)
where
(15) νaκa = νb(1− κb)
and κb is the unique solution to
log
(
(1− κb)2
κb(νa/νb − 1 + κb)
)
=
(
1 +
νa
νb
)
1
1− κb .
Although νa and νb may differ, provided they are both positive the thresholds κa and κb are both inside the
interval (0, 1) and ensure the necessary balance (15) between bids and asks that are matched.
If there are market orders, that is if µa, µb ≥ 0, then this results in a rescaling of the distribution (14)
provided the support of the rescaled distribution remains contained within the interval (0, 1).
5.1.2. Market impact. As a further illustration, consider the case where fa(x) = fb(x) = 1, x ∈ (0, 1),
νa = νb = 1 and µa, µb ≥ 0. Use the notation pib(µa, µb;x), pia(µa, µb;x) for the solution to equations (12)
satisfying the required boundary conditions in this case. Then provided µa/(1+µb), µb/(1+µa) < w(≈ 0.278)
this solution has pia(µa, µb;x) = pib(µb, µa; 1− x) and
(16) pib(µa, µb;x) =
pib ((1 + µb)x+ µa(1− x))
1 + µa + µb
, x ∈
(
w(1 + µb)− µa
w + 1
, 1− w(1 + µa)− µb
w + 1
)
where pib(.) is the earlier solution (2).
An important assumption for our mathematical development has been that all orders are for a single
unit, and an outstanding question concerns the extent to which the model can be generalized. In practice,
a long-term investor who wishes to buy or sell a large number of units may choose to spread the order in
line with volume in the market, so as not to unduly move the price against her [8]. We are able to analyze
the market impact of a particularly simple approach, when the investor leaks the order into the market
according to an independent Poisson process over a relatively long period, where the market relaxes to the
new equilibrium dynamics over that period. Thus the impact of a large market order to buy will be to
increase the parameter µb to say µb + . As  increases the time taken to complete the order decreases, but
the impact on the distribution (16) increases, leading to an overall less advantageous trading price. Similarly
if a large limit order is leaked into the market as an independent Poisson process, this can also modeled by
a perturbation of equations (12).
In markets with a relatively small set of participants with large orders there may be advantages in market
designs where large transactions may be quickly arranged at fixed prices; [7] discuss trading protocols that
complement limit order books for large strategic investors.
5.1.3. One-sided markets. Toke [25] has considered a special case where analytic expressions for various
quantities such as the expected number of bids in a given interval are readily available, as we now describe.
Suppose that fb(x) = 1, x ∈ (0, 1), νa = µb = 0 and µa > νb > 0. Thus all bids are limit orders and all
asks are market orders, a one-sided market. Then pib(x) = νb/µa, x ∈ (κb, 1) where κb = 1 − µa/νb. And,
further, for x > κb the number of bids present in the interval (x, 1), that is B(x, 1), is a birth and death
process whose stationary distribution is geometric with mean νb(1−x)/(µa− νb(1−x)). Thus, for example,
E[B(x, y)] can be readily calculated.
Various generalizations are also tractable, provided the market remains one-sided [25]. For example,
suppose each bid entering the LOB is cancelled after an independent exponentially distributed time with
parameter θ unless it has been previously matched. Then the number of bids present in the interval (x, 1)
is again a birth and death process. Now the entire LOB is a positive recurrent Markov process, and it
is straightforward to verify that, as θ ↓ 0, bids to the left of κb are seldom matched and the stationary
distribution of the rightmost bid approaches pib(x) = νb/µa, x ∈ (κb, 1), as we would expect.
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5.2. Trading strategies. Next we consider a few simple strategies that can be analyzed using our model.
For simplicity, we present the results for the case when the bid and ask price distributions are equal and
uniform on (0, 1), but the analysis easily extends to other arrival distributions. The limiting densities of the
rightmost bid and leftmost ask for this model were determined in Corollary 2.3.
5.2.1. Market making. We begin by considering a single market maker who places an infinite number of bid,
respectively ask, orders at p, respectively q = 1− p, where κb < p < q < κa. Thus whenever q is the lowest
ask price, the trader obtains all bids that arrive at prices above q, and whenever p is the highest bid price,
she obtains all asks that arrive at prices below p, making a profit of q− p per bid–ask pair so acquired. Call
the orders placed by the trader artificial, to distinguish them from the natural orders. The rate at which
the trader is able to match her orders is proportional to p times the probability that the rightmost bid is
exactly p.
Placing an infinite supply of bids at a level below κ has no asymptotic effect on the evolution of the LOB.
For p > κ ≈ 0.218 no ask is accepted at a price less than p, and there will be a positive probability that the
rightmost bid is exactly p (i.e., there are no bids at prices above p). To find this probability, we consider
the following alternative model L˜: there is an infinite supply of bids placed at 0, but the price equivalence
function P˜ is constant on [0, p]. (Otherwise, the initial state, arrival processes, and price equivalence functions
coincide in L and L˜.) In L˜, the bids and asks above p will interact just as in L, so the probability that the
rightmost bid is the infinite order in L is equal to the probability that the rightmost bid is at or below p in
L˜. Note that only finitely many of the bids placed at 0 will ever be fulfilled in L˜. By Lemma 3.1, pathwise,
at all times the difference between the bid/ask queue sizes in L˜ and a limit order book without the infinite
supply of bids at 0 will be bounded by the overall number of bids departing from that infinite supply. Hence
the infinite bid at 0 is irrelevant for the analysis of the steady-state distribution of the highest bid, since in
the limit t→∞ the difference will disappear.
In L˜, asks at prices below p cannot stay in the book, i.e. $a(x) = 0 for x ≤ p. By Remark 5, the density
of the highest bid $b(x) is equal to 1/x on [κb, p), and to C
(
1
x + log
1−x
x
)
on [p, q] (the latter is obtained as
in Corollary 2.3). Recall that $b is continuous, which allows us to determine C and κb (since $b integrates
to 1). This allows us to find κb as
κb =
p
e
(
1− p
p
)C
and to deduce that the rightmost natural bid has density
$b(x) =

1
x
,
p
e
(
1− p
p
)C
≤ x ≤ p;
C
(
1
x
+ log
1− x
x
)
, p ≤ x ≤ q;
where C = (1 + p log((1− p)/p))−1. The probability the rightmost natural bid is p or less is thus 1−C log((1−
p)/p), and this is therefore the probability that the rightmost bid is exactly p in the model with infinitely
many artificial bids at p and infinitely many artificial asks at q = 1− p, where κ < p < 1/2 < q.
To maximize the profit rate we need to solve the optimization problem
maximize (1− 2p)p
(
1− C log 1− p
p
)
where C =
(
1 + p log
1− p
p
)−1
subject to p ∈ [κ, 1/2].
The maximum is attained at p ≈ 0.377, and gives a profit rate of ≈ 0.054.
5.2.2. Sniping. We next consider a trader with a sniping strategy: the trader immediately buys every bid
that joins the LOB at price above q, and every ask that joins the LOB at price below p (with q = 1−p still).
Now the trader has lower priority than the orders already in the queue, but she obtains a better price for
the orders that she does manage to buy.
The effect on the LOB of the sniping strategy is to ensure there are no queued bids above q and no queued
asks below p; for p < q, the set of bids and asks on (p, q) has the same distribution in the sniping and the
market making model, and therefore the probability that p is the highest bid is the same as in the market
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Figure 2. Profit from sniping and market making strategies. Solid line is the sniping
strategy, dashed line is the market making strategy. (Sniping with p < 1/2 is shown for
completeness; as argued in the text, it does not maximize the profit.)
making model as well. (The profit rates for the trader are different.) But it also makes sense to consider
the sniping strategy with p > q, when it ensures that there are no queued orders of any kind in the interval
(q, p): they are all sniped up by the trader. (An ask arriving at price a ∈ (q, p) cannot be matched with a
queued bid, because there are no queued bids above q.) The trader makes a net profit of zero on the orders
in (q, p); the point of sniping them is to increase the probability of being able to buy a bid at a high price.
Summarizing, if p > q then the LOB has no queued orders between p and q. Since all the bids are at
prices below q, and the ask density there is zero, we seefrom Proposition 4.2 that the density of the rightmost
bid is $b(x) = 1/x on [κb, q); since $b integrates to 1, we find κb = q/e. Notice that the distribution of the
rightmost bid stochastically decreases as q decreases, hence the probability of acquiring an ask at low price
a < 1/2 increases as q decreases. This shows that the profit rate from sniping bids above q and asks below
p for p > 1/2 is strictly higher than the profit rate from sniping bids above p and asks below q. Thus, it
suffices to consider the case of p > 1/2 > q. We thus solve
maximize
∫ 1−p
κb
(1− 2x) log x
κb
dx where κb =
1− p
e
subject to p ∈ [1/2, 1].
The maximum is attained at 1− p = q = e/(e2 + 1) ≈ 0.324 and gives a profit rate of ≈ 0.060.
Figure 2 presents a comparison between the profit rates from the market making and sniping strategies,
as a function of p (which, recall, is the price below which the trader would like all asks) – for completeness,
p < 1/2 is included for the sniping strategy as well.
5.2.3. A mixed strategy. It is possible to consider a mixture of the above strategies: the trader places an
infinite supply of bids at P (thus acquiring all asks that arrive below P whenever P is the highest bid price),
but in addition attempts to snipe up all the additional asks that land at prices x < p. We assume the trader
gets the best of the two possible prices when both p and P are larger than the price of the arriving ask.
There are several possible cases corresponding to the relative arrangement of p, P , and 1/2:
(1) If p < P (this means that there are no additional asks to snipe up), this degenerates to the mar-
ket maker strategy, with a profit of (1 − 2P ) per bid–ask pair bought, with pairs bought at rate
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Figure 3. Profit rate from the mixed strategy as a function of sniping threshold p and
infinite bid order location P .
P log(P/κb). (The probability of the highest natural bid being below P is log(P/κb); when it is
there, asks arrive at prices below P at rate P .) Clearly, one wants P < 1/2 in this case, otherwise
the profit is negative, so we can write this case as p < P < 1/2.
(2) If P < p < 1/2, then one gets additional asks at price x at rate log(x/κb), for a profit of (1 − 2x),
for all x from P to p.
(3) If P < 1/2 < p, there are two further cases: we may have P < 1− p or P > 1− p.
(a) If P < 1 − p < 1/2 < p < 1 − P , then the trader snipes all orders between 1 − p and p for a
net profit of 0. Profit (1 − 2P ) from a bid–ask pair matching the infinite orders is generated
at rate P log((1 − p)/κb), and profit 1 − 2x, P ≤ x ≤ 1 − p, from sniping is generated at rate
1 + log(x/κb). By Remark 5, the highest bid density is 1/x on (κb, 1− p], so κb = (1− p)/e.
(b) If 1−p < P < 1/2 < 1−P < p, then P is always the best bid, which means that the trader gets
all the asks that arrive below P , generating profit at rate (1− 2P )P . Orders arriving between
P and 1 − P cancel each other, and all the asks arriving between 1 − P and p are bought up
for a loss (negative profit) of (1− 2x).
(4) Finally, the case P > 1/2 is silly, because every bid–ask pair bought will be bought at a loss.
Figure 3 shows the profit for the two-parameter space. The largest profit is obtained when P = 1−p = 1/4,
and the profit is then acquired at rate 1/8 = 0.125. This corresponds to the trader placing an infinite bid
order at 1/4 (thus buying all asks that arrive with price below 1/4 for 1/4), an infinite ask order at 3/4, and
sniping up all orders that join the LOB at prices between 1/4 and 3/4.
5.3. Competition between traders. Finally we comment on the situation that arises when multiple
traders compete using the simple strategies described in Section 5.2.
Consider first the case of two competing traders, the first of whom has the ability to employ a sniping
strategy of the form described in Section 5.2.2, and the second of whom cannot act quickly enough to snipe
but does have the capacity to employ a market making strategy of the form described in Section 5.2.1.
Suppose then the market maker places an infinite number of bid, respectively ask, orders at P , respectively
1 − P , where P ≤ 1/2. And suppose the sniper immediately buys every bid that joins the LOB at price
above q, and every ask that joins the LOB at price below 1− q, where P ≤ q ≤ 1/2.
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For given P and q the behavior of the LOB is as analyzed in Section 5.2.3: but incentives for the two
traders are different. Given P and q the profit rate for the sniper is
∫ q
P
(1−2x) ln(ex/q)dx and for the market
maker (1− 2P )P ∫ P
q/e
1/x dx = (1− 2P )P log(eP/q) provided P > κb = q/e. If P < q/e the market maker’s
orders are outside of the recurrent range (κb, 1 − κb) of the LOB and so are not matched. It is natural to
suppose the sniper follows the market maker: that is the sniper observes the choice P of the market maker
and chooses q accordingly. The maximizing choice for the sniper is then q =
√
P (1− P ). Given this, the
optimum choice for the market maker, that maximizes his profit rate, is P ≈ 0.340. At this equilibrium, the
profit rate of the market maker is 0.073 and of the sniper 0.020.
Consider next the case of two or more traders using either the market making strategies of Section 5.2.1
or the mixed strategies of Section 5.2.3. Each trader will have an incentive to improve slightly the prices
at which she places infinite orders of bids and asks, thus gaining all the profit from those orders for herself
alone. The Nash equilibrium has the traders compete away the bid-ask spread and with it all their profits.
The model becomes an example of the Bertrand model of price competition and, as there, the conclusion is
softened with more realistic assumptions on, for example, capacity constraints or cost asymmetries.
Next consider competition between two or more traders using the sniping strategies of Section 5.2.2; for
example between traders who attempt to snipe a limit order as it arrives with an exactly matching limit
order. If multiple traders attempt to simultaneously snipe the arriving order, than one of them will succeed
and the others will cancel their own orders immediately as they detect that their orders have not been
successful. There is clearly an advantage for a trader who can snipe an arriving order more quickly than
the other traders, and indeed such a trader can enforce the optimum sniping strategy of Section 5.2.2 and
exclude slower traders from the market. It has been argued that competition on speed is wasteful (see [3]),
and there are proposals to encourage traders to compete on price, rather than speed, as for example in the
proposal of [4] where a market continuous in time is replaced with frequent batch auctions, held perhaps
several times a second. We shall explore the consequences of competition on price between sniping traders
who can all react at the same speed to a new order entering the LOB.
In such a competitive environment traders will have an incentive to increase the price q above which they
snipe bids, and decrease the price p below which they snipe asks, towards 1/2: they will refrain from sniping
orders on which they would expect to make a loss. At the Nash equilibrium, each trader will snipe at all asks
with prices below 1/2 and at all bids with prices above 1/2 (getting the order with the same probability as
each of the other traders). The rightmost bid will then have density 1/x on (1/(2e), 1/2) by Remark 5. This
results in a combined profit rate 1/(2e) − (1 + e2)/(8e2) ≈ 0.042. Thus price competition between sniping
traders has decreased their combined profit rate only slightly, from 0.060 to 0.042. Alternatively, one can
view this reduction as the effect of a batch rather than a continuous market.
Next we comment on the impact of traders on the bid-ask spread. The mean of the distribution (2) can be
calculated and is simply (1− κ)/2. Thus without traders the mean spread between the highest bid and the
lowest ask in the LOB is κ ≈ 0.218, while the maximum spread is 1− 2κ ≈ 0.564. At the Nash equilibrium
between sniping traders both are increased, the mean spread to 1/e ≈ 0.368 and the maximum spread to
1 − 1/e ≈ 0.632. For comparison, with a single sniping trader both are further increased, the mean spread
to 1− 2(e− 1)/(e2 + 1) ≈ 0.590 and the maximum spread to 1− 2/(e2 + 1) ≈ 0.762; and at the equilibrium
between a market making trader and a sniping trader the mean and maximum spread are as low as 0.228
and 0.320 respectively. These calculations are of course for a specific example, but they do illustrate the
tractability of the model and its insights.
As a final remark we comment on the inventory of traders under the Nash equilibrium between sniping
traders described above. Observe that the LOB below 1/2 evolves independently of the LOB above 1/2, and
both processes are positive recurrent inside their corresponding thresholds. Consider the net position of the
traders collectively, that is all the bids they have matched minus all the asks they have matched, observed at
those times when the LOB is empty. This evolves as a symmetric random walk, and is null recurrent. Slight
variations of the traders’ strategies would moderate this conclusion: for example, a trader might refrain from
sniping bids close enough to 1/2 when his net position is large. And of course such variations will be essential
over longer time-scales than those considered in this paper where the arrival price distributions may vary.
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